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Abstract
Relational concepts play a central role in human perception and cognition, but little is known about how they are acquired.
For example, how do we come to understand that physical force is a higher-order multiplicative relation between mass and
acceleration, or that two circles are the same-shape in the same way that two squares are? A recent model of relational
learning, DORA (Discovery of Relations by Analogy; Doumas, Hummel & Sandhofer, 2008), predicts that comparison and
analogical mapping play a central role in the discovery and predication of novel higher-order relations. We report two
experiments testing and confirming this prediction.
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Introduction
Human thoughts routinely express relations between two or
more things. From mundane musings like, ‘‘this box won’t fit into
the trunk of my car’’ or ‘‘my kids won’t eat that for dinner’’, to
more interesting fare such as, ‘‘these data are consistent with that
hypothesis’’ or ‘‘you can’t get a four-way interactions out of a
three-variable design’’, relational thoughts are ubiquitous in
human cognition. Relational concepts underlie our understanding
of everything from how to prepare a meal or drive a car to how to
solve mathematical, scientific or legal problems. The capacity to
understand and reason about abstract relations is a major factor
distinguishing adult cognition from the cognitive abilities of
children (e.g., [1–4]), and, along with language, is the major
factor distinguishing human cognition from the cognitive abilities
of other animals (including our closest cousins in the animal
kingdom; [5–7]).
A great deal is known about how people use relational concepts
in the service of reasoning, problem solving and everyday life (see,
e.g., [5,8,9]). By contrast, little is known about where these
concepts come from in the first place: How do people acquire the
relational concepts that serve as the currency of so much of their
cognition? For example, how do we come to understand that
higher-than is a relation in its own right, so that one object may be
higher than another, even if both are low (e.g., close to the floor;
[10]), or that two circles are the same-shape in the same way that
two squares are? This question is important because the
vocabulary of relations a person understands has an enormous
influence on the kinds of problems that person can and cannot
solve. For example, a fundamental difference between an expert
physicist and a novice is that the former understands physical
relations that the latter does not (e.g., [11]). More fundamentally,
understanding how the mind comes to discover relations and
represent them as explicit predicates would contribute substan-
tially to our understanding of the origins of human perception and
thinking, and to the development of symbolic thought [4].
Acquiring relational concepts is difficult, in part, because (at
least in the limit) relations are invariant with their arguments:
Smaller-than means the same thing in smaller-than (rhinoceros,
elephant) as in smaller-than (mouse, rat). It is precisely this
invariance that allows relational representations to serve as the
basis of analogy (see [5,6,9,12]). However, this invariance makes
relational concepts difficult to acquire because all the examples of
relations that we encounter in the real world are instantiated with
specific arguments: One never gets to observe pure disembodied
smaller-than-ness; instead, smaller-than is always observed as instances
of one concrete thing that is smaller than some other concrete
thing. Similarly, one does not observe disembodied loves or
ameliorates. Given this, how do people come to represent relations
such as smaller-than, loves or ameliorates in a way that is independent
of their arguments?
A solution to the problem of how representations of relations
can be learned from examples has been proposed in a recent
model called DORA (Discovery of Relations by Analogy; [13]). The
very basic idea behind the DORA model is that when we
encounter instances of relations between objects, we compare
them to other similar instances we have encountered before. This
comparison consists of mapping one instance onto the other.
During mapping, any properties common to both instances are
aligned, and consequently highlighted. Via intersection discovery
the system will learn what the instances have in common (i.e., what
is invariant between instances of a relation) while learning to
ignore details on which they differ. For example, when DORA
observes two instances of chasing – e.g., a dog chasing a cat, and a
boy chasing a girl – it will compare and map them. Mapping the
dog onto the boy, DORA will allow DORA to, via intersection
discovery, abstract any features they share – here the properties of
being a chaser – and represent those features as an explicit structure
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that can take arguments (i.e., a predicate). Mapping the cat and
the girl will, similarly, allow DORA to learn a representation of
chased. Although the early representations of relations that DORA
learns will be colored by the irrelevant details of the first examples
it experiences (e.g., the dog and boy might also share the
properties of being male), applied iteratively, intersection discovery
will eventually yield representations of relations that are arbitrarily
indifferent to their arguments (see [13]). Doumas and colleagues
demonstrated that this simple comparison-based learning algo-
rithm accounts for more than 35 major findings in the literatures
on cognitive development and relational learning in both children
and adults (e.g., [13–19]).
One of DORA’s key theoretical insights is that comparison
plays a central role in the discovery of novel relational concepts.
That is, to learn a novel relation, two instances of the relation must
be compared, and corresponding elements of the two relations
(i.e., those elements playing the same roles) must be mapped. For
example, to learn a relation like pushes, two instances of pushing
must be compared such that the two elements doing the pushing are
mapped and the two elements being pushed are mapped. DORA
thus predicts that a relation cannot be learned from a single
instance. However, it is important to note here that this prediction
does not imply that DORA must observe or experience any
specific instance of a relation to learn that relation or represent
that instance. DORA learns representations from specific instances
and refines these representations over experience with future
instances. However, once DORA has learned a relation it can
apply that relation to any applicable instances in the future. For
example, DORA learns a relation like chase (x, y), it can apply that
relation to future instance of chasing, including instances involving
objects it has never seen chasing one-another (e.g., representing
that chases (teapot, teacup)), or even objects it has no experience
with (e.g., representing that chases (galoop, grindel), where a galoop
and a grindel are novel objects). More formally, DORA can learn
a relation R(A,B), with {(a,b) a element of A, b element of B} with
Figure 1. Examples of the stimuli used in Experiment 1. The top row contains two exemplars from Category X; the bottom row contains two
exemplars from Category Y. Each exemplar consists of three cells in a circle. Cells differ in their size, their location in the circle, the thickness of their
membranes (the outer wall of the cell), the roundness of their nuclei (the large grey oval in each cell), the number of organelles in the cell (the small
white ovals). In exemplars from Category X, cells with thicker membranes also have rounder nuclei. In exemplars from Category Y, cells with thicker
membranes also have more elongated nuclei.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063889.g001
Relation Discovery and Predication
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experience of only a small set of specific a,b pairings. See [13] for
several demonstrations of this point.
Consistent with this hypothesis, several studies have demon-
strated that making analogical mapping (i.e., a structured
comparison) bootstraps the induction of relational schemas (e.g.,
[3,20–22]), and that comparison, a cousin of mapping, can help
people discover which features and relations are relevant in a given
task ([23–30]). While many specific theories of mapping exist (e.g.,
[5,9,12,13,31]), they all fall generally under the umbrella of [32]
structure mapping theory. According to structure mapping theory
when an analogy is made between two domains (a target and a
source) similar predicates representing object properties and
relations are aligned and explicit connections or mappings are
made between them. Arguments of mapped predicates are then
themselves aligned and mapped. For example, when making an
analogy between a situation where a dog chases a cat –
represented as chase (dog, cat) – and another where a boy chases
a girl – represented as chase (boy, girl) – the two chase predicates will
be aligned and mapped. Based on the mapping between the two
chase predicates dog and boy will be aligned and mapped (by virtue
of both being agents of the chase relation) and the cat and girl will
be aligned and mapped (by virtue of both being patients of the
chase relation). While various mapping theories put different
amounts of weight on how factors such as systematicity (preferring
mappings between systems of relations) and pragmatics will
influence the alignments and subsequent mappings, the general
format of aligning predicates followed by aligning their arguments
central to structure mapping theory is accepted widely.
The current experiments were designed to investigate DORA’s
prediction that comparison bootstraps the discovery of novel
relations. Because finding simple relations that are unknown to
adult humans is difficult, the current studies focused on the
discovery of novel higher-order relations (i.e., relations whose
arguments are themselves relations).
Overview of the Experiments
We present two experiments investigating DORA’s predictions
about the role of comparison in the discovery and predication of
novel higher-order relations. Both experiments used category
learning as an index of relational learning: Categories were
defined by novel higher-order relations among an exemplar’s
elements (as elaborated shortly). The categories were constructed
so that only by discovering the relevant higher-order relation could
participants achieve above-chance categorization performance.
Accordingly, participants’ categorization performance served as an
index of learning the higher-order relation.
Experiment 1 was conducted to test of the role of comparison in
participants’ ability to discover novel relations. The stimuli were
designed so that the relevant first-order relations (those over which
the category defining novel higher-order relations were defined)
would be salient to undergraduates (our participant population).
Experiment 2 acted as a more stringent test of the role of
comparison, per se, in the learning and predication of novel
relations. It used the same basic paradigm as Experiment 1, but
with more abstract stimuli and an additional manipulation.
Specifically, the stimuli were designed to make the the comparison
task difficult, so that some participants would fail to find the
correct correspondences and thus fail to discover the category-
relevant higher-order relation.
Ethics Statement
Human subjects approval was obtained for both experiments
from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Institu-
tional Review Board operating from the UCLA Office of the
Human Research Protection Program. All participants provided
written consent before participation.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 served as a basic test of DORA’s prediction about
the role of comparison in participants’ ability to discover novel
relations. As noted above, DORA predicts that in order to
discover a novel relation it should be necessary and sufficient to
compare two situations and map the corresponding elements over
which the novel relation holds. That is, mapping two exemplars in
which a novel relation holds should lead to the discovery and
predication of that relation. However, in the absence of mapping,
the relation should remain undiscovered even when participants
are otherwise exposed to it.
In order to test for relation discovery, we defined novel (to the
participants) higher-order relations and used these relations to
define two categories. Exemplars consisted of drawings of three
simple ‘‘cells’’ inside a circular frame (see Figure 1). Within an
exemplar, the cells varied in their location in the frame, their
shape, the thickness of their membrane, the roundness of their
nucleus (large grey oval), and the number of organelles (smaller
white ovals). Categories were defined by a higher-order relation
Figure 2. Analysis of the category structure of Experiment 1.
Rows correspond to values of ‘‘nucleus roundness’’; columns corre-
spond to values of ‘‘membrane thickness.’’ Any cell resides at one entry
in the matrix (circles in the matrix). A single exemplar consists of three
cells (i.e., three circles from the matrix). Members of X consist of three
cells connected by lines of finite positive slope (such as the dashed line).
Members of Y consist of three cells connected by lines of finite negative
slope (such as the solid line). Gray bars indicate values withheld from
training exemplars for use during transfer. Circles marked ‘‘G’’
correspond to cells that can appear only in category X; circles marked
‘‘g’’ appear only in X during training, but in either X or Y during transfer.
Cells marked ‘‘H’’ only appear in category Y; those marked ‘‘h’’ appear
only in Y during training, but in either X or Y during transfer. Values ‘‘g’’
and ‘‘h’’ are misleading in that a participant who learns to categorize
based on them (i.e., based on feature conjunctions) will make
systematic errors during transfer. Unmarked cells appear with equal
likelihood in X or Y.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063889.g002
Relation Discovery and Predication
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Figure 3. Probability of correct response on post-mapping and transfer trials as a function of condition in Experiment 1 (a). The
dashed line indicates chance. (b) Probability of correct response on pre-mapping trials (PM), successive blocks of post-mapping trials (8 trials per
block; ‘‘1…5’’), and transfer trials (T) as a function of mapping performance in Experiment 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063889.g003
Figure 4. Examples of the stimuli used in Experiment 2. The top row contains two exemplars from Category X; the bottom row contains two
exemplars from Category Y. Each exemplar consists of three triangles in a square-frame. Triangles differ in their location in the square-frame, their
color, the width of their base (marked by the bold line), and their orientation from 0-degrees. In exemplars from Category X, triangles with thicker
bases are more misoriented from 0-degrees. In exemplars from Category Y, triangles with thicker bases are less misoriented from 0-degrees.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063889.g004
Relation Discovery and Predication
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between the cells’ membrane thickness and the roundness of their
nuclei: In Category X, the thicker a cell’s membrane, the rounder
its nucleus; in Category Y, the thicker the membrane the more
elliptical its nucleus. The cells’ locations in the frame, shape, and
number of organelles varied randomly and were uncorrelated with
category membership.
The exemplars were designed to make category learning
impossible without discovering the higher-order relation between
relative membrane thickness and nucleus roundness. To this end,
absolute thickness and roundness were non-predictive of category
membership, as were relative thickness and relative roundness in
isolation (i.e., in every exemplar of both categories, some
membranes were thicker than others and some nuclei were
rounder than others; see Figure 2). It is only possible to achieve
ceiling-level categorization performance using the higher-order
relation between relative thickness and relative roundness to define
category members: If, as the cells’ membranes got thicker (relative
to the other cells in the exemplar) their nuclei got rounder (relative
to the other cells), then the exemplar belonged to X; if the opposite
held, it belonged to Y. These category-defining higher-order
relations were chosen because they were unlikely to be familiar to
undergraduates prior to the experiment (and hence learnable
during the course of the experiment), although the relevant first-
order relations are likely to be salient. In addition, as elaborated
below, we also conducted extensive pretesting with the categories
to make sure that participants did not already know the category-
defining relations.
Our hypothesis was that comparing two stimuli from the same
category and mapping corresponding elements from the stimuli
onto one another (as elaborated below) would cause participants to
discover and predicate the critical higher-order relation defining
their category membership. If the hypothesis is correct, then
categorization performance should improve markedly after
performing such a comparison (relative to performance prior to
comparison). To the extent that mapping facilitates discovery and
predication of the category-defining higher-order relations, post-
mapping categorization performance in the Map condition should
go rapidly to ceiling, whereas post-study categorization perfor-
mance in NoMap should remain near chance.
Methods
Participants. 20 undergraduates (10 in Map; 10 in NoMap)
participated for course credit.
Materials. Seven membrane thicknesses and seven nucleus
roundnesses were used to construct the stimuli. As a result, the
thickest membrane (or roundest nucleus) in one exemplar of a
category could be the thinnest (or most elliptical) in another
exemplar of the same category. It was therefore impossible to
categorize correctly based on absolute membrane thickness and
nucleus roundness (see Figure 2).
Membrane thicknesses 3 and 7 (the thickest) and nucleus
roundnesses 1 (the least round) and 5 were excluded from the
exemplars presented during the pre-mapping, post-mapping, and
mapping phases, reserving them for use on the transfer trials
(elaborated directly below). The transfer exemplars were created
as described above, with the additional constraints that at least one
novel thicknesses and one novel roundness appeared in each
exemplar, and each novel thickness and roundness appeared in at
least three of the six transfer exemplars. The withheld thicknesses
Figure 5. Analysis of the category structure in Experiment 2.
The logic is identical to that of the matrix in Figure 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063889.g005
Figure 6. Probability of correct response on post-mapping trials as a function of condition in Experiment 2 (a). (b) Probability of
correct response on transfer trials as a function of condition in Experiment 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063889.g006
Relation Discovery and Predication
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and roundnesses consisted of values both within and outside the
bounds of the values seen during the training and test phases, and
thus required participants to both interpolate and extrapolate to
new values.
Procedure. Participants received 40 pre-mapping training
trials (20 Xs and 20 Ys) in a random order. Their task was to
indicate whether each belonged to Category A or B (the labeling of
X and Y as A or B was counterbalanced). They received feedback
on every trial indicating whether they had categorized the
exemplar correctly or incorrectly. To the extent that the
category-defining relations are unfamiliar, performance should
be near chance during these trials. Following these trials, half the
participants – those in the Map condition – performed a
comparison task, and the other half of the participants – those
in the NoMap condition – performed a study task. Participants in
Map condition were shown two exemplars of the same category (X
or Y, counterbalanced) and asked to compare the two instances
and indicate which cell in one exemplar corresponded to which in
the other and to explain why (i.e., to map the elements in one
exemplar to elements in the other). Participants were informed
that the exemplars came from the same category but they were not
told which. A participant was considered to have mapped correctly
if during the mapping task she aligned corresponding cells from
the exemplars. That is, if both exemplars where from Category X,
then a correct mapping would be to align the two cells with the
thickest membranes and roundest nuclei one onto the other (i.e., to
align the cell from the first exemplar with the thickest membrane
and roundest nucleus to the cell in the second exemplar with the
thickest membrane and the roundest nucleus), the cells with the
thinnest membrane and most elongated nuclei one onto the other,
and the cells with the middlemost membrane thickness and
nucleus roundness one onto the other. Alternately, if both
exemplars where from Category Y, then a correct mapping would
be to align the two cells with the thickest membranes and most
elongated nuclei one onto the other, the cells with the thinnest
membrane and most round nuclei one onto the other, and the
remaining two cells one onto the other. Participants were given no
feedback about the correctness of their mapping. Participants in
the NoMap condition viewed the same exemplars, but were not
instructed to map them onto one another; instead, they were told
that the exemplars came from the same category and instructed to
study them for one minute. All participants then received 40 post-
mapping training trials with feedback. In the transfer phase
participants viewed six transfer exemplars (3 Xs and 3 Ys) in a
random order. Their task was to categorize each without feedback.
After the transfer trials participants were asked what rule (if any)
they had used to categorize the exemplars.
Results and Discussion
The results were as predicted. For the pre-mapping trials, an
independent-samples t-test revealed no effect of mapping,
t(18) = 1.13, p.25, which is expected, as the groups received
identical treatment prior to mapping. Moreover, neither group’s
performance differed reliably from chance.
An independent-samples t-test on the post-mapping trials
(Figure 3a) revealed that accuracy in the Map condition (mean
= 77) was reliably higher than in NoMap (mean = 48),
t(18) = 3.84, p,01. Accuracy in NoMap did not differ from
chance.
A similar pattern obtained on the transfer trials (Figure 3a).
Accuracy in Map was reliably greater (mean = .83) than in
NoMap (mean = 42), t(18) = 4.16, p,01. Performance in NoMap
did not differ from chance.
Figure 3b depicts the trial-by-trial data for participants who
mapped correctly (7 participants from Map) against those who did
not (3 from Map and 10 from NoMap). Initially all participants
were at chance. However, after the mapping phase the perfor-
mance of participants who mapped correctly climbed rapidly to
ceiling, whereas participants who did not map correctly remained
at chance throughout the experiment.
Participants’ reports of their mappings and rule use also
revealed an interesting pattern. None of the participants in
NoMap, and 7 participants in Map correctly stated the rule
defining category membership at the end of the experiment. All
and only those participants who correctly mapped the elements
during the mapping phase correctly stated the category-defining
relation. All other participants either missed the relevant
dimensions completely or categorized based on absolute mem-
brane thickness and absolute nucleus roundness, which, as stated
previously, was not sufficient for correct categorization.
In Experiment 1, all and only those participants who correctly
mapped exemplars to one another went on to correctly categorize
them during the post-mapping categorization and transfer phases.
Experiment 2 was designed as a more stringent test of the necessity
and sufficiency of mapping for relational discovery and predica-
tion.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 served as a more stringent test of the role of
mapping, per se (as opposed to other cognitive processes that may
go on during mapping), in the learning and predication of novel
relations. It used the same basic paradigm as Experiment 1, but
with different stimuli and an additional manipulation. Each
exemplar in Experiment 2 consisted of three isosceles triangles
inside a square frame (see Figure 4). The triangles differed in their
location inside the frame, their color (one was red, one blue and
one green) their width at their base and their orientation. The
category-defining relation was the higher-order relation between
the triangles’ relative orientations and relative width: In category
X, the more a triangle was rotated away from the upright, the
wider it was at its base, whereas in category Y, the closer a triangle
was to upright, the wider it was at its base. The triangles’ locations
inside the frame were non-diagnostic and their colors were semi-
diagnostic. These stimuli were designed to make the mapping
difficult, so that most participants would fail to find the correct
mapping by default. In order to use a relation as a basis for
mapping, it is necessary to predicate that relation (i.e., to represent
it as an explicit structure that can take arguments; see
[5,9,12,13,31]). However, pilot work revealed that undergraduates
did not, by default, predicate a triangle’s orientation in the picture
plane.
In this experiment, prior to the Map or (NoMap) study task, half
the participants (the Difference-identification (DI) group) were given a
task in which they were asked to state how the triangles within a
single exemplar differed from one another. This task was designed
to cause the participants to predicate the relevant first-order
relations in the exemplars (as elaborated below). The other half of
the participants (the No-difference-identification (ND) group) were
simply instructed to study an exemplar for one minute. Following
the DI or (ND) study task, participants participated in the Map/
NoMap tasks as in Experiment 1. DI vs. ND was crossed
orthogonally with Map vs NoMap.
The reasons for the additional manipulations were two-fold.
First, to the extent that (a) explicit predication of the relevant first-
order relations is necessary for successful mapping, and (b)
successful mapping is necessary for relation discovery, only those
Relation Discovery and Predication
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participants in both the Compare and Map conditions should
discover the critical higher-order relation, and only they should be
able to categorize the stimuli during post-mapping categorization
and transfer.
Second, one potential criticism of experiment 1 was that it was
not mapping, per-se, that led participants to discover the relevant
relations, but rather some other cognitive process associated with
mapping, such as talking about the exemplars, or comparing items
within an exemplar rather than between exemplars. By introduc-
ing the second DI/ND condition we controlled for these
extraneous cognitive operations. If indeed simply talking about
exemplars or comparing items from within a single exemplar is
sufficient to lead participants to predicate the novel relations, then
participants in the DI group should predicate the relevant relations
whether or not they perform the mapping task. On the other hand,
if mapping is a necessary component of predication of novel
relations, then just as in Experiment 1, only participants who
perform the mapping task correctly should reach above-chance
categorization performance.
Methods
Participants. 64 undergraduates (16 per condition) partici-
pated for course credit.
Materials. Each exemplar consisted of three isosceles trian-
gles (Figure 4), which differed in width, orientation, color and
location. To make the triangles’ orientations unambiguous, the
base of each triangle was marked with a bold line. There were 13
orientations (from upright, 0u, to 180u in 15u increments) and 13
widths. To make the triangles discriminable, no two triangles in
any exemplar were of adjacent widths or orientations. These
constraints made it possible for the most misoriented/widest
triangle in one exemplar of a category to be the most upright/
narrowest in another, making it impossible to categorize correctly
based on the triangles’ absolute orientations or widths.
The locations of the triangles in an exemplar varied randomly
(participant to the constraint that they not overlap), and their
colors covaried imperfectly with category membership: In 80% of
Category X, the widest triangle was red and the narrowest blue; in
20% this relationship was reversed. In category Y this relationship
was reversed. In all exemplars, the middle-width triangle was
green.
We withheld widths 2, 7 and 13, and orientations 8, 11 and 13
for construction of transfer exemplars. Transfer exemplars were
constructed as described above, with the additional constraint that
at least two novel widths and two novel orientations appeared in
each. The withheld widths and orientations consisted of values
both within and outside the bounds of the values seen during
training, requiring participants to both interpolate and extrapolate
during transfer (see Figure 5).
Design and Procedure. DI vs. ND and Map vs. NoMap (see
above) were crossed orthogonally, resulting in four between-
participants conditions. All participants first received 40 pre-
mapping categorization trials in random order. Following these
trials, participants in the DI condition were shown two exemplars
of the same category and instructed to state how each triangle in
the exemplar on the left differed from the other triangles in that
exemplar. Those in the ND condition were instructed to study the
exemplar for one minute. Next, the Map and NoMap conditions
proceeded as in Experiment 1. All participants then performed 20
post-mapping categorization trials with feedback, followed by six
transfer trials without feedback.
Results and Discussion
The results were again as predicted. For the pre-mapping trials,
a two-way between participants ANOVA showed no main effects
of either Map/NoMap, F(1, 60) = .023, p.05, or DI/ND, F(1,
60) = 211, p.05. There was a slightly reliable mapping-by-
comparison interaction, F(1, 60) = 5.273, p,05, but Bonferroni
post-hoc tests (a=5) revealed no significant differences between
any groups. No group differed reliably from chance in their pre-
mapping categorization performance.
A different pattern appeared after the mapping condition,
however (see Figure 6a). A two-way ANOVA on post-mapping
categorization trials revealed that participants who mapped
categorized reliably more accurately than those than those who
did not, (68% vs. 55%) F(1, 60) = 11.607, p,01. A similar pattern
obtained for participants in DI vs. ND, (67% vs. 56%) F(1,
60) = 8.978, p,01. There was no reliable interaction,
F(1,60) = 2.064, p.05. Post-mapping classification accuracy was
higher in DI/Map than in the other three conditions. A
Bonferroni post-hoc test at the a=05 level revealed a reliable
difference between DI/Map and both ND/NoMap (DM=4.88,
t(30) = 4.369, p,01) and DI/NoMap (DM=3.69, t(30) = 3.304,
p,01). The difference between DI/Map and ND/NoMap
approached reliability (DM=3.38, t(30) = 2.694, p= 011), but
did not meet the set Bonferroni criterion. No differences between
the other three groups were reliable. Post-mapping classification
accuracy was no greater than chance in any condition except
Compare/Map.
A similar pattern obtained on the transfer trials (Figure 6b). The
effects of Map/NoMap, F(1, 60) = 35.799, p,01, and DI/ND,
F(1, 60) = 10.274 p,01, and the Map/NoMap-by-DI/ND inter-
action, F(1, 60) = 7.717, p,01, were all reliable. A Bonferroni
post-hoc analysis revealed a reliable difference between DI/Map
and ND/NoMap (DM=2.75, SE= .45, p,01), ND/Map
(DM=2.00, SE= 45, p,01), and DI/NoMap (DM=2.00,
SE= 45, p,01), and no differences between any other groups.
Again only performance in the DI/Map condition was greater
than chance.
The participants’ reports of their rule use revealed the same
pattern as observed in Experiment 1. None of the 32 participants
in ND/NoMap and DI/NoMap, 3 participants in ND/Map and
14 participants in WI/Map correctly stated the rule defining
category membership at the end of the experiment. As in
experiment 1, there was a 1:1 correspondence between partici-
pants who performed the mapping task correctly and those who
correctly stated the rule (every participant who mapped correctly
also correctly stated the rule at the end of the experiment). These
results are predicted by the hypothesis that mapping, per se,
facilitates the discovery and predication of novel higher-order
relations.
Discussion
Relations play a central role in human perception and thinking,
yet little is known about how relational concepts are acquired. The
results of two experiments suggest that comparison and mapping
facilitate the discovery and predication of novel higher-order
relations. In both experiments, participants who successfully
mapped exemplars from the same category onto one another
learned a novel, category-defining higher-order relation between
their elements and no participant who failed to map correctly
succeeded in learning the relation. Indeed, categorization perfor-
mance of the latter group never got above chance.
Importantly, participants who successfully mapped were able to
both interpolate and extrapolate learning to new exemplars with
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novel stimulus values (i.e., novel membrane thicknesses and
nucleus roundnesses in Experiment 1 and novel orientations and
widths in Experiment 2) and to verbally state the relational rules
defining category membership. Participants who did not map were
unable to either transfer to new stimuli or to state the rule. In line
with DORA’s prediction, these findings suggest that mapping
bootstraps the discovery of novel relations, and that the resulting
relations are represented explicitly, in the sense of being available
to bind to novel inputs (see [9,12,13,33]).
In addition, the results of Experiment 2 support to the
prediction made by all structure-based models of analogy that
explicit predication of the relevant relations is necessary for
successful structure mapping (e.g., [5,9,12,13,31]). More specifi-
cally, we found that discovering that a higher-order relation
applied in a particular instance required mapping the component
lower-order relations that act as arguments of that higher-order
relation (e.g., discovering that the higher-order covaries relation
applies to the relations wider-than and more-misoriented about
triangles requires mapping based on those lower-order relations).
Successfully mapping instances based on lower-order relations
(e.g., mapping two triangles that are both most-misoriented and most-
wide) requires first representing those lower-order relations.
The findings reported here suggest that the same cognitive
mechanisms that underlie our ability to make analogies – namely,
those underlying structure mapping – also underlie our ability to
discover and predicate the relational concepts that support those
mappings. If this suggestion is correct, then the evolution of the
capacity for generalized structure mapping may well be the ‘‘great
leap forward’’ [34] that ultimately gave rise to our capacity for
generalized symbolic thought [6].
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